The U.S. president has so far resisted calls to pivot from unequivocal support for Israel's war in Gaza, now in its third month. Netanyahu's endless self-interest and obstinacy will make him the loser when Biden acts

There are two major Mideast issues currently preoccupying Washington: The obstinacy exhibited by Mr. Benjamin Netanyahu, which has bred annoyance and resentment across the ocean, and the specter of a broader regional conflagration involving the U.S., which would amount to a distraction. The two are entwined, but deserve separate attention.

Netanyahu is deliberately seeking a confrontation with the Biden administration. It serves his "I stand up to American pressure" fake bravado and is part of his attempt to turn October 7 into a much greater historic conflict about a Palestinian state and Iran. I, and others, have written about this before, but now it seems that the realization matured in Washington, with reports of "frustration," "anger" and "disappointment" towards Netanyahu, who is not seen as an ally. In a nutshell, Israel is an ally, its prime minister is not.

President Biden has faced pressure to gradually pivot from his initial unequivocal support for the war in Gaza given Netanyahu's lack of cooperation, but he apparently resisted these calls (Israel is under attack and I, Joe Biden, will be there). But Netanyahu's ingratitude has apparently soared to intolerable levels.

This rift goes back all the way to the judicial coup Netanyahu instigated between January and October of last year that caused a major fissure in the supposed "shared values" between the countries and resulted in him being snubbed from a visit to the White House in 2023.

Since the Israel-Hamas war began, American resentment has grown in fertile geopolitical ground: South Africa's charge of genocide at the International Court of Justice, Netanyahu's constant evasion regarding plans for postwar Gaza governance and his disregard for American interests. Following a phone call that ended with Biden brusquely declaring "this conversation is over" and his admission to supporters in a private event in Boston that "I know" of Netanyahu's antics and intentions, the two have not spoken for 22 days. Between October and December, the leaders spoke several times a week.

The Biden administration has also concluded that not only does Netanyahu have a vested political interest in prolonging the war – as he resists and derides any and every American idea on Gaza's "day after" – but he is dragging the U.S. toward a regional conflict.

If Biden does choose to change course, what are his realistic options? To begin with, he knows that 75 percent of American Jews will vote for him no matter what he does with Netanyahu. Those 75 percent, who were shocked by October 7, worry about the effects of the attack on them but harbor very little sympathies for Netanyahu, who has essentially ignored and excommunicated them for years.

Biden essentially has six different tools in his arsenal: 1. He can disengage altogether and tell Israel "I did my best, do what you want, call me at 1-202-456-1414 when you're serious," like James Baker III said in 1990. But that ignores the regional dimension and America's involvement. 2. He can admonish Netanyahu publicly and blame him for failing to cooperate and endangering Israel. 3. He can slow down the transfer of arms and munitions to Israel. 4. He can abstain or even support a new UN Security Council resolution calling for a cease-fire. 5. He can demand a cease-fire, something the U.S. has conspicuously refrained from doing until now. 6. The most audacious option: In coordination with Saudi, Egypt, Jordan, UAE and Qatar, he can publish the U.S.' vision for postwar Gaza, including Israel's integration in the axis, complete with normalization with Saudi Arabia, and present this to Israel over Netanyahu's head. "I have been there for you, I care about your security, I will guarantee your security, but I also care about your future. Here is what I propose, and I will back you through the process."

The regional approach seems to be the most promising, but the region is also where the U.S. sees ominous signs of escalation. In the last week, foreign policy and media discourse was replete with suggestions that a broader, by-proxy regional conflict has already begun and that further escalation may be inevitable. U.S. and British strikes on Yemen's Houthis in western Yemen and the Red Sea and attacks on pro-Iranian militias in Syria and Iraq all reflect a widening conflict. Yet the U.S.' net assessment is that Iran is not interested in a direct confrontation with it and that, in fact, Hamas' October 7 massacre and ensuing U.S. involvement are an impediment and a disruption to Iran's regional strategy. "I don't think Iran wants a war," Biden stated late last week.

The American geopolitical calculus obviously includes a central economic dimension. The Houthi attacks shifted from an irritating distraction into a real threat to markets, maritime tariffs, shipping insurance rates and even disrupted global supply chains. The Red Sea accounts for 15 percent of total global maritime trade, including 12 percent of seaborne oil and 8 percent of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). Freight rates for a standard 20-foot container went up from $1,500 to $4,000 and major shipping companies halted Red Sea routes. The effect on Egypt is most dramatic: Monthly Suez Canal transit fees revenues are around $743 million, or $9 billion a year. Going around the Cape of Good Hope on the southern tip of Africa adds approximately two weeks of journey to a ship sailing from, say, Shanghai to Rotterdam.

Oil is currently at just below $73 per barrel (for West Texas Intermediate - WTI). In late October it surged to $95 a barrel amid fears of a wider regional escalation but gradually went down, despite a mini-surge last week after U.S. and British strikes on the Houthis and uncertainty about both the conflict expanding and further disruptions to commercial shipping through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Asked about the impact of the attacks on oil prices, Biden said he was "very concerned," adding "that's why we've got to stop it [Houthi attacks]."

The U.S. views October 7 as a fault line that clearly positions two axes against one another: The axis of chaos, terror and instability led by Iran, supported by Russia, with Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis and militias in Iraq, and the axis of order led by the U.S. with Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Qatar and a revitalized Palestinian Authority. Part of the U.S.' effort to consolidate the axis will include a modified U.S.-Saudi-Israel-Palestinian deal. This is where the two issues, regional conflict and Netanyahu's intransigence, converge.

Soon, very soon, Biden will need to make a decision and a course correction. Not at the expense of America's support of Israel, but at the expense of Netanyahu, who now serves to further neither Israeli nor American interests, only his own.