We present to your attention an interview with Lieutenant General (Retired) Ben Hodges. He took part in the Iraq and Afghan wars and held high positions in the NATO hierarchy. Now he is Senior Advisor to Human Rights First since June 2022. Prior he held the Pershing Chair in Strategic Studies at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). General Hodges also serves as NATO Senior Mentor for Logistics and consults for several companies in Europe, NATO, and the European Union. Ben Hodges is co-author of the book “Future War and the Defence of Europe” (2021).

War, elections in the US and its impact on the situation in Ukraine

Natalia Vlasenko: Thank you for taking the time to do this interview. First, I will speak about war, Donald Trump and the US. After the election of a new US president, the world expects the US attitude towards the war of Russia against Ukraine may change for the worse. How do you see the US strategies for resolving the conflict based on who has been nominated for the positions of Trump’s national security advisors, mentioning Mike Waltz?

Ben Hodges: Well, I think that even President Trump does not really know exactly where he wants to go with this. Certainly based on things he said in the past, I would be concerned. But based on what I’ve heard from people like retired General [Keith] Kellogg, Mike Waltz, others, and also knowing that many of the senior Republican leaders in the Congress are pro-Ukraine I still have a little bit of optimism. President Trump will come into office with much more leverage over Vladimir Putin than he had eight years ago. Economically, politically, and because Russia is so damaged now from this 11 years of war. The potential is there that it could go well and based on what I see and hear from the Ukrainian government in Kyiv. I think President Zelenskyy’s office is approaching this in a wise way. At the end of the day, it’s in America’s interest that Ukraine is successful, and I hope that President Trump will see it that way.

N.V.: How likely is it that President Trump will change his approach to the war in Ukraine, declaring his public promises after actually occupying the presidential chair in the White House and receiving the completeness of all the information available to the current president?

B.H: I think attitudes of presidents evolve or change a little bit once they are actually in office and they have the responsibility for what happens. Unlike, when you’re on the campaign, you can say whatever, but when you’re in office, you own it. And I think he will be a little bit more thoughtful about this. I think if he can be persuaded that it’s in America’s interest and he can see an opportunity and actually he can do this. I mean, the Biden administration, which did a lot of good for Ukraine, failed to deliver everything that was approved. So there still will be almost two billion dollars’ worth of aid that haven’t been delivered yet. And President Trump doesn’t have to do anything. He can just let that keep going, take credit for it. And he can also use that as leverage over Vladimir Putin. So, we’ll see. I think European leaders are probably trying to convey to President Trump that this will be a real problem for the United States as well as Europe if Ukraine fails. So, and also, if they say that China is the real concern, you know, just helping Ukraine defeat Russia will also send a strong message of deterrence to China.

N.V.: From your expert view, what is the best way to end the war for the US? Freezing the conflict for Trump’s term, resolving the conflict in the format of the Korean or Finnish scenario with the transfer of part of Ukraine to Russia’s sphere of influence, or a radical escalation of the situation and Russia’s defeat in the event of maximum support from the United States and NATO?

B.H.: Ultimately, the Ukrainian government, of course, has a huge say in how this goes forward. But the best thing that could happen would be for the American president to say publicly, very clearly, that it is in our interest that Ukraine wins, that it defeats Russia, and that Russia has pushed back to the 1991 borders. And therefore, because it is in our interest, we’re going to do everything necessary to ensure that Ukraine can win. That would send such a powerful signal. And I think a lot of other countries would get in line with that because they want that as well, but they’re worried about Russian retaliation. And I think Trump could say, look, Russia’s not going to use a nuclear weapon. We don’t believe they’re going to use a nuclear weapon. We’re going to help Ukraine defeat Russia here that would be the best thing this should have happened last year but we failed to make that commitment uh it’s not too late to make that commitment uh of course Russia is not stupid or without capabilities and Ukraine has things to improve but I don’t see a good outcome for Ukraine if Russia is allowed to retain of Ukrainian territory. And if there’s no NATO membership or strong U.S. presence inside Ukraine, I don’t see a good outcome for Ukraine.

Restoring Ukraine’s Nuclear Potential: Very Expensive and Unnecessary

N.V.: Let’s turn to another block of questions. It’s about the nuclear map of the world. The first question is concerning the nuclear status of Ukraine. In the early 1990s, Ukraine had the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world. However, in 1996 Ukraine officially renounced its nuclear status for the sake of peace relying on the security guaranteed from the Budapest Memorandum. [In recent years] Ukrainian officials have repeatedly hinted that they’re considering a scenario of restoring its nuclear status. So, the question is, do you consider it realistic for Ukraine to restore its nuclear status from a technical and political point of view given that Ukraine is no longer bound by the Budapest Memorandum?

B.H.: I think it’s understandable why Ukraine and now even Japan and South Korea, Poland, other countries, [for example] Sweden, are thinking about maybe they should have a nuclear weapon, if they’re not confident that the United States will be reliable in this. It’s understandable. And we live, as much as we would like it not to be so, we live in a nuclear world. And as long as bad people like Russia and China, North Korea, Iran have nukes or want to have nukes, you have to be able to deter that. But I think it would be a bad outcome if there was nuclear proliferation. If other countries started trying to produce nuclear weapons, that would be unfortunate. And this is not necessary. The United States should make it very clear that we will, in fact, be that nuclear deterrent for countries so that they don’t have to get their own nuclear weapons. First of all, there are legal ramifications, diplomatic ramifications, but also there is enormous cost. It is very expensive to have nuclear weapons. I don’t know that that’s the best investment for Ukraine.

N.V.: And in case we imagine Ukraine decides to renew its nuclear status and have nuclear weapons, what potential reaction should we expect from the US and EU if Ukraine develops or announces the creation of nuclear weapons?

B.H.: I don’t know what the reaction would be of course but there would be people inside the European Union that would have probably a problem with this and that could affect perhaps Ukraine’s essential accession to the EU. I know your government will have already thought of that, but I can’t predict how others will react. I would imagine most people would ask them not to do that.

“I cannot imagine anything good for Ukraine accepting anything other than 1991 borders”

N.V.: Next questions concerning the consequences of the war. This piece is quite big, so I will just split it into smaller questions. During the almost three years of the full-scale war in Ukraine, representatives of NATO member countries have voiced many problems. Low defence spending, the inability of armies to fight, and Trump’s hints at possible withdrawal from NATO and threats to Canada and Denmark. Given your experience as a former commander of the US Army in Europe, what do you think if the countries of Eastern Europe, together with Ukraine, announced the creation of an alternative military bloc, how would NATO and the US in particular react?

B.H: At the end of the day, every sovereign nation has the right to protect itself and to make alliances and arrangements that give it the best security. That’s the duty of every government, to protect their people. I can imagine that there will be regional or other types of arrangements for countries to protect themselves. That would be a mistake for the United States if we did not have a strong enough, if we did not make sure that NATO answered everybody’s security requirements to include Ukraine. Ukrainian membership in NATO would make NATO better immediately, as well as obviously be a security guarantee for Ukraine. And I think that should be our focus.

N.V.: So, given Trump’s uncertain policy towards NATO and the problems listed above, are all members of the organization ready to implement Article 5 regarding the most vulnerable members, for example, Baltic states in case of Russia’s invasion?

B.H.: Yes, I’m sure of that. I mean, even when you have problematic countries like Hungary or Slovakia, if an ally is attacked, I think that, yes, I am confident that all members of the alliance would agree to Article 5. Now, as you probably know, and many of your listeners will know, Article 5 doesn’t mean that people have to do anything. You know, it’s a political decision, but the expectation is that people will come to the aid of whoever was attacked. And I am confident that that will still happen.

N.V.: The next question connected with the borders of post-war Ukraine. Should Ukrainians expect to return to the 2022 borders by military means if the Trump administration decides to provide large-scale military support to Ukraine, or will we have to accept Putin’s terms and withdraw troops from the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia region?

B.H.: I cannot imagine anything good for Ukraine accepting anything other than 1991 borders. Crimea is Ukrainian sovereign territory. As long as Russia controls Crimea, they will block access up into the Azov Sea. They will be in a position from which they could restart the war and they could disrupt shipping. I think that again this would be a decision for the Ukrainian government. I look at Russia [and] they look weak. They’re weaker now than they were a year ago. So, if the West would continue to hope that Ukraine will have the capability and the desire to continue to push Russia out of the illegally occupied territories.

N.V.: How quickly will Russia be able to restore its military potential for the new attacks? And how quickly will sanctions in the military sector, for example, on military and dual use goods be lifted?

B.H.: Of course, it depends on if and when the war does come to an end, what is the situation. If it ends with the status quo now, then I think in two or three years, you’re going to see Russia, they’ll have had time to rebuild, rearm, correct their mistakes, and resume the conflict, because they’ll be confident that we don’t have the will, and that we lost interest. If, however, they are defeated, defeated and forced back to the 1991 borders, then I think you’ll see a different regime in Moscow and a Russian government that would focus internally versus externally. And that would be a good thing for everybody in Europe.

N.V.: Concerning the strategies Ukraine shall take, do you think that a purely defensive strategy of Ukraine could lead to a positive outcome of the war for Ukraine, or shall it be combined with something?

B.H.: What do you mean by defensive strategy? I think Ukraine has correctly focused on regaining the sovereignty of its territory. But to launch the attack, the counter-offensive intercourse direction, for example, I thought was a brilliant move because it changed the narrative. It took the initiative away from the Russian side and forced the Russians now to have to deal with a strategic and operational challenge. That seems entirely appropriate. And a part of a good defense is being able to go on the offense when you need to at the operational level. I think I like the way that Ukraine has approached this. Now, certainly, Ukraine has got to do things to improve, continue to improve its armed forces, both in terms of size and in the making sure that it provides armed forces that Ukrainian families trust, or husband or sister will not be wasted, but that they would not be sent into combat until they were properly trained and equipped and put into a unit that is properly trained and equipped. That’s the job of the government to do that. And I think this has got to be part of the overall effort, as well as, of course, growing the defense industry inside Ukraine.

The shadow of a new “iron curtain” hangs over Europe

N.V.: You have experience serving during the Cold War in Germany, in Europe. Do the current times remind you of those years when the world was divided into the democratic West and the Soviet zone of influence? Can you say where this curtain is and how long this period lasted?

B.H.: There are similarities, of course’s Russia, China, Iran, North Korea and it would cause us to develop capabilities and industrial capacity that would be equal to the task. For example, if you defeat Russia first, that would isolate Iran, because Iran has no friends in the world except Russia. It would isolate North Korea, which also has no friends in the world except Russia. And it would send a powerful message of deterrence to China, that yes, the West does have the political will, the industrial capacity, and the military capability to stop Russia. That would be important for the Chinese to see that right now. I don’t believe that they think we do connect these threats together. And also, we have to use our economic tools much better. Russia is only able to keep buying ammunition and drones because they are selling oil and gas to China and India. But we have to stop that, stop their “shadow fleet”* from going through the Baltic Sea or the Black Sea with this and these unseaworthy vessels, the so-called shadow fleet. Certainly, we can find a way to stop that, but we haven’t done that yet.

N.V.: Hopefully, it can happen shortly. Both before the war and now, there are voices that some European and American politicians are engaged in appeasement of the aggressor, hinting at the agreements with Hitler in Munich in 1938. Can we say that in 2025 a deal behind Ukraine’s back is possible, as was the case with Czechoslovakia in 1938?

B.H.: Well, I don’t want to say nothing’s impossible. What I do hope is that the United States and our allies will take the steps necessary to say that it is in our interest that Ukraine is successful and that we help Ukraine defeat Russia, not get to some negotiated outcome where Russia is rewarded for its aggressive behavior. So, that’s what I’m going to continue to advocate for.

N.V.: And what will happen with this country after Putin? Will his absence change the policy? Just a rhetorical question, indeed.

B.H.: Of course, we don’t know, but we must be prepared for this possibility. I think almost everybody was surprised that the Soviet Union collapsed. It happens so suddenly. We were not prepared for what happened after the collapse of the Soviet Union. So, I think we should be anticipating the eventual collapse. I think the Russian Federation is collapsing now. It’s not in a straight line, but it is happening. We should be thinking about what will happen. There will be refugees. There will be concern about nuclear weapons. There will be people concerned about control of oil and gas and all the other resources. And some parts of the Federation will want to become independent, others will choose to remain affiliated with Moscow. We should be thinking about how we want that to end up.

N.V.: And a few more questions, more personal about you. So, what is your personal motivation for being on Ukraine’s side in this war?

B.H.: Well, on a strategic level, I believe everything I’ve said thus far that defeating Russia is important to protect the things that we cared about ever since the end of the Second World War. Sovereignty, respect for international law, respect for human rights, freedom of navigation, the UN Charter. I believe in that. I also believe that it’s in the interest of my country and of Europe. And you know, I live here in Germany, although I’m an American, that defeating Russia first will improve Europe’s security and therefore American security for decades. And it would deter China. These are the reasons strategically. On a more personal level, of course, I have been working with Ukrainians for many years. Going back to 2005-2006 when I was in Iraq a second time. We had Ukrainian troops with us. I had friends from that time who are now senior Ukrainian officers still fighting. But they were young officers then. So that personal friendship and then I made friends with Ukrainian civilians as well as military people in the government, people in the media when I was a commander of U.S. Army Europe, people for whom I have deep respect and I’m inspired by what they do.

B.H.: Nobody should be tired except the Ukrainians. I mean, why would anybody in the US or in Europe be tired? This is a failure of our political leadership to explain to our populations why Ukraine matters. I think in the United States we had very long wars in Vietnam and in Iraq and Afghanistan. It comes down to people understanding why we’re doing it. And I think if our leadership would explain why this was so important to us, that this is not about charity for Ukraine, that this is for us, then most people would say, Ok, that makes sense. But unfortunately, we have not had that kind of strategic leadership that has made the case very well.

N.V.: Do you mean, people need more explanation to understand the meaning?

B.H.: Yes. I mean, if you live in Texas or California or Michigan or New York, you’re like, Ok, yeah, why does this affect me? It’s easy for me to understand, but I deal with it all the time. This is where our civilian leadership should explain it.